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This study investigates extreme tail risks in financial markets of the euro-candidate
countries and their implications for monetary policies. Our empirical tests show the
prevalence of extreme risks in the conditional volatility series of selected financial
variables, that is, interbank rates, equity market indexes and exchange rates. We argue
that excessive instability of key target and instrument variables should be mitigated
by monetary policies. Central banks in these countries will be well-advised to use both
standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy while steering their
economies out of the financial crisis and through the euro-convergence process.
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INTRODUCTION
Volatility shocks associated with the global financial crisis of the period
2007–2009 have magnified extreme risks in both mature and emerging
financial markets (Orlowski, 2010b). This study investigates the proliferation
and scale of these risks as well as their repercussions for the conduct of
monetary policies in the euro-candidate countries.
Extreme tail risks result from the leptokurtic distribution of financial
market variables. This phenomenon is well known in practice and widely
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researched in the literature. In essence, a leptokurtic distribution means
that observations are more dispersed around the mean value and assume
more extreme values (ie have fatter tails) than they do in a normal
distribution. Thus financial variables that are close to the mean value in
normal market periods may be widely dispersed at turbulent times, which
results in their ‘fat tails’. Interest rates and other financial variables that
serve as instruments or policy monitoring parameters for central banks are
characterized by such distribution. These variables are vulnerable to
sudden volatility outbursts, and thus may become very unstable (Orlowski,
2010b). Extreme tail risks of these financial variables impair implementation of monetary policy when the policy is based on parsimonious rules
that commonly assume normal distribution of key variables, thus ignoring
their leptokurtic time-pattern. In essence, extreme volatility shocks inhibit
monetary policy transmission mechanisms and reduce the efficiency of
standard interest-rate policies (Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Svensson, 2010).
We argue that outbreaks of extreme tail risks in the euro-candidates
during financial crises call for extraordinary monetary policy responses that
cannot be based on standard Taylor rules. To mitigate tail risks, monetary
policies ought to be comprehensive and supplemented with appropriate
macro- and micro-prudential regulatory policies. These policy requirements,
coupled with international coordination, are precepts of our proposed new
financial stability framework for economies converging to the euro.
Our empirical investigation is focused on detecting extreme tail risks
(or fat tails) in the distribution of selected financial market variables, namely,
equity market indexes, interbank rates and exchange rates, all of which are
relevant for the conduct of monetary policies in converging economies. We
analyze volatility patterns of these variables in the euro-candidate countries
that are pursuing relatively independent monetary policies with flexible
exchange rates, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania.
For comparative purposes Slovakia is also included. Although it has already
adopted the euro as of January 2009, it embraced a flexible exchange rate
regime during the euro-convergence period. The selected countries have
been pursuing inflation targeting without a formal disclosure of a specific
instrument rule (Orlowski, 2005, 2008a). However, a recent examination of
their monetary policies’ possible adherence to open-economy instrument
rules (Orlowski, 2010a) suggests that, in the case of the Czech Republic and
Poland, the inflation gap is still a predominant driver of central bank reference
rates. In contrast, adjustments of the Hungarian reference rate are associated
mainly with changes in the exchange rate gap. There is no evidence that
the central bank reference rates in these countries respond to the desire to
lower the output gap. In light of these findings, we support the argument of
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Svensson (2003) that a targeting rule is less rigid than an instrument rule.
However, we intend to examine whether the flexible inflation targeting
pursued by our selected countries has played any role in lowering extreme tail
risks associated with the recent financial crisis.
Our analysis is focused on three types of market risks that directly affect
monetary policy decisions: equity market risk, interest rate risk and exchange
rate risk. We employ GARCH volatility tests augmented with the in-mean
GARCH variance as a proxy of a risk premium or discount. For the purpose of
evaluating the degree of leptokurtosis, that is, the prevalence of fat tails in the
conditional volatility patterns, we apply the generalized error distribution
(GED) parameterization. Our working assumption is that the estimated GED
parameters of the examined financial market variables are considerably lower
than 2, indicating the existence of fat tails.
The next section reviews the literature on the sources of extreme risks
and their severity during the financial crisis of the period 2007–2009. The
setup of the analytical models is explained in the subsequent section. The
empirical results based on the GARCH-M-GED testing are presented and
discussed in the section after that. The penultimate section suggests monetary
policy responses to extreme risks embedded in the examined financial market
variables within our proposed new financial stability framework for the eurocandidates. The final section provides a summary.

MONETARY POLICY RULES: ACCOUNTING FOR TAIL RISKS
A key question in our analysis is whether monetary policy can be effective in
containing extreme risks, such as those precipitated by the global financial
crisis of the period 2007–2009. There is no common answer to this question
in the literature. A standard prescription based on the actual policies
following the Great Depression of the 1930s is that monetary policy cannot
effectively contain the crisis because it is unable to lower the cost of credit
in the presence of severe shocks to credit markets. The ability of the central
banks to stabilize the financial system is also constrained as large budget
deficits are often financed by money creation, which leads to high inflation
and currency depreciation.1 Notwithstanding these hindrances, we find
plausible the arguments by Mishkin (2009) and Jobst (2009) that there is a
1
This holds true particularly for emerging market economies, as fiscal stimulus applied
in response to financial crisis results in higher public debt and higher debt servicing cost thus
increasing the risk of sovereign default. See the examination of the limited capacity of emerging
market countries to engage in fiscal stimulus by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: chapter 12).
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leading role for monetary policy in overcoming the crisis and ensuring
financial system stability in the future. The question remains whether
emerging market economies, including the euro-candidates, are equipped
with sufficient monetary policy tools to respond effectively to financial crises.
With respect to the 2007–2009 crisis, there is a general consensus that
the substantial monetary policy easing aimed at alleviating its damaging
real economy effects was indispensable (Curdia and Woodford, 2010).
Without these liquidity injections the cost of credit would be much higher,
significantly increasing credit spreads and possibly precipitating systemic
risk. These expansionary monetary policies reduced interest rates on risk-free
securities and narrowed credit spreads. Consequently, by the end of 2009,
credit spreads decreased to the levels preceding the outbreak of the financial
crisis in August 2007. In essence, central banks in advanced economies
have become ‘lenders of first (rather than last) resort’. They have engaged
extensively in providing liquidity to banks that had lost trust in each other,
and suspended interbank lending, particularly in the aftermath of the global
credit freeze that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers Inc. in early
October 2008. In retrospect, the vast and unprecedented liquidity injections
by the Federal Reserve and other central banks helped alleviate a severe
economic recession. There is no consensus, however, whether, in the aftermath
of the crisis, monetary policy should depart from discretionary easing and
return to ‘the set of principles for setting interest rates that worked well
during the Great Moderation’, as suggested by Ahrend (2008) and Taylor
(2009).
The answer to this question lies in the distribution of key monetary policy
and other relevant financial variables and in the underlying behavior of agents
in a monetary economy. In fact, the leptokurtic distribution of these variables
is ubiquitous (Mishkin, 2009; Orlowski, 2010b). Under such a distribution,
the volatility of these variables is well contained during normal market periods,
but it tends to increase significantly at turbulent times, resulting in extreme
tail risks. Therefore, approximations of variable fluctuations based on the
assumption of a normal or Gaussian distribution tend to severely underestimate
the de facto risks during turbulent or financial crisis periods.
The roots of extreme tail risks are quite complex. Among their main
causes are unanticipated corrections of asset prices and, as in the recent
crisis, a bank credit freeze stemming from an increasing liquidity risk due to
the rapidly depreciating value of assets that cannot be easily liquidated. It has
been pointed out in the literature that money supply is strongly and positively
related to asset prices (Minsky, 1982a, b; Borio and Drehmann, 2009a, b).
Rising profit expectations increase asset prices, making speculation on assets
more profitable. As the balance sheet of financial institutions expands,
Comparative Economic Studies

H Gabrisch & LT Orlowski
Extreme Risks in Financial Markets and Monetary Policies

515

their willingness to lend, resulting in an endogenous expansion of
the money supply. An imminent asset price bubble might induce higher
market interest rates due to the rising demand for funds to invest in assets. If
asset-price inflation passes through to income inflation, the central bank’s
loss function would signal higher losses, and the bank would increase its
policy rate. A minor ‘not-unusual’ surprise (Minsky, 1982a) or an exogenous
shock-like contagion eventually punctures the asset price bubble, reversing
the endogenous expansion of the money stock. As credit markets freeze, debt
depreciation, deflation and output decline follow. This is the point when a
tranquil period turns into a turbulent one, reflected in elevated volatility
and higher risk of monetary and financial variables. Hence, the underlying
leptokurtic distribution of key monetary and financial variables seems to be
in line with Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis (Minsky, 1982a, b), and
Kindleberger’s (1988, 2005) history of ‘manias and crashes’, and it is consistent
with the origin and the course of the United States housing market implosion
that initiated the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (Orlowski, 2008b).
The leptokurtosis or extreme tail risks in a market economy pose
challenges for central banks as they obscure the loss and the reaction
functions.2 The first challenge is that both functions are based on judgments
about the development of flow aggregates, such as commodity prices, output
and interest rates, assuming that deviations from target or equilibrium are
caused either by the business cycle or by stochastic shocks. However,
leptokurtosis results mainly from asset price movements, caused by unstable
judgments of agents about the long-term development of prices of financial or
real assets. Indeed, there is evidence that central bank policies become
ineffective during the periods of monetary tightening aimed at abating asset
price inflation. Minsky observed this problem in the United States during the
credit crunch of 1966, the liquidity squeeze of the period 1969–1970 and the
recession of the period 1974–1975. Each time, the financial industry evaded
monetary tightening by devising financial innovations and extending credit.
Hence, Minsky concluded that ‘monetary constraint in a situation in which
ongoing investment activity leads to a rising demand for finance is effective
only as it forces a sharp break in asset values’ (Minsky, 1982a, p. 77). The
most recent example of the Minsky phenomenon is the Federal Reserve’s
attempt to reduce inflationary pressures by increasing the federal funds rate
in the period 2004–2006. Financial innovations devised to circumvent these
restrictions contributed to the asset price bubble, and subsequently became
toxic (Orlowski, 2008b).
2
We omit discussion of other important assumptions such as the central bank’s knowledge of a
welfare function or a clear articulation of optimal policy rules (see Polito and Wickens, 2008).
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The second problem lies with the central bank’s reaction function.
During the tranquil period preceding the global financial crisis of the period
2007–2009, monetary authorities adopted non-discretionary, instrument-rulebased policies with adjustments of the short-term interest rate as the
predominant policy tool (Taylor, 1993). An inflation target, supplemented
with output gap and/or exchange rate stability, served as a key policy goal.
The underlying assumption for these Taylor-rule-based policies was a normal
distribution of policy variables over time. Svensson (2003) questioned the
effectiveness of rigid Taylor rules under asymmetric distribution of the
variables and instead proposed target rules with more discretion. The recent
financial crisis has underscored the importance of active responses to extreme
tail risks that are associated with a leptokurtic distribution of key monetary
variables and stem from their volatility outbursts (Orlowski, 2010b). For this
reason, non-discretionary policies based unconditionally on Taylor rules are
likely to be inadequate for containing extreme tail risks. In essence, the
underlying risks associated with episodes of elevated volatility of the policy
variables can be managed more effectively with discretionary policies.
Adjustments of short-term interest rates constituted a predominant
monetary policy instrument during the ‘Great Moderation’ period. Such a
parsimonious approach seems no longer relevant in light of the recent
crisis, which has precipitated the need for massive liquidity injections to
financial institutions through central banks’ purchases of risky assets. As a
result, monetary policies of both highly developed and emerging market
economies can no longer simply focus on a single policy target. The policy
formulas have become more complex, incorporating as a target not only
price stability, but also economic growth, exchange rate stability and,
perhaps most importantly, containment of a systemic risk. This may require
monitoring of individual categories of risk such as the market, liquidity,
credit, default, exchange rate, counter-party and other risks faced by the
financial sector and the real economy as increases in these risks may
translate into higher systemic risk.
The third challenge for central banks is rooted in the erosion of their
independence. This does not mean a loss of independence stemming from
government interference, but rather a loss of power due to liberalization and
deregulation of financial markets. With such constraints on their power,
central banks have limited ability to counteract financial crises, particularly in
emerging market economies whose currencies are not used as international
reserves. A theoretical explanation of this phenomenon can be found in
Wolfson (2002), who states that the debt-deflation character of a crisis
turns into a debt-devaluation interaction through which the volatility of key
monetary and financial variables becomes strongly affected by international
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events. In the tranquil period, free capital flows and deregulated markets
induce local agents to take loans denominated in the reserve currency instead
of in the local currency as long as interest rates on the reserve currency credit
are lower than on the local currency credit. As a result, the local central bank
de facto and gradually loses economic independence, because the increasing
inflows of foreign capital are difficult to sterilize. Higher domestic policy rates
attract more foreign currency-denominated borrowing and induce domestic
currency appreciation. However, in the case of financial crisis accompanied
by local currency depreciation, holders of debt denominated in foreign
currency may face a greater default risk. Then, the ability of the central bank
to act as a lender of last or ‘first’ resort is limited and depends on its access to
reserve currency.
An erosion of central bank independence has affected the euro-candidate
countries, all with non-reserve currencies, particularly in the aftermath of a
far-reaching liberalization of capital flows and financial sector deregulation as
necessitated by their active preparations to satisfy the Maastricht convergence
criteria (Gabrisch, 2009). Moreover, high interest rate differentials between
their domestic and foreign currency-denominated credits have strengthened
incentives for local agents to take debt in foreign currency, although this
effect has not been uniform among the examined countries (Hanousek et al.,
2009). A rising demand for foreign credit has bolstered capital inflows. In
addition, widening interest rate spreads have contributed to the appreciation
of local currencies, the steady course of which has diminished the exchange
rate risk.
We now proceed to evaluation of the magnitude and precipitation of
extreme tail risks of monetary variables in the euro-candidate countries
in order to suggest an appropriate course of monetary policies during
preparations for the euro adoption. A strong evidence of extreme tail risks in
these countries would call for a more discretionary approach to monetary
policy, disconnected from the steady course implied by a Taylor rule.

MODEL SETUP AND DATA
Monitoring equity market risk is an important task for monetary authorities,
particularly at times of financial distress. Although the volatility of equity
market risk does not customarily enter into the central bank’s loss function or
instrument rules, it has far-reaching reverberations for the credit markets,
capital flows, financial and tangible investments, and exchange rate movements, all of which affect the conduct and direction of monetary policy. In
fact, it has been documented in the literature that precipitation of equity
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market risk, proxied by increases in the VIX volatility index in the United
States, had strong spillover effects on credit and liquidity risks during the
course of the recent financial crisis (Mizen, 2008; Orlowski, 2008b). In
essence, the volatility dynamics of equity markets are a good indication of
investors’ confidence in the country’s financial stability and resiliency against
external financial contagion. For this reason, equity market risk dynamics
could serve as an important monitoring device for monetary policy makers.
Monitoring interest rate risk is equally crucial for monetary policy decision
making, because its proliferation reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy
instrumentalization. Central banks of the euro-candidates ought to consider
a relative interest rate risk that can be captured by the volatility dynamics of
short-term interest rates in their respective countries vis-à-vis the volatility of
the corresponding interest rates in the eurozone. Such an approach lets them
set a time path for the interest rate risk premium vis-à-vis the eurozone,
which is important for the successful implementation of monetary policy
during the course of convergence to the euro.
Exchange rate risk is the third market risk category. This risk is tied to the
instability of a possible exchange rate target and to the unreliability of the
exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Needless to say, this
channel serves as a focus of monetary policy implementation in the economies
converging to a common currency. Elevated exchange rate risk at stressful
market periods confuses asset valuation and credit pricing in the banking
sector. It subsequently necessitates higher interest rates and tighter credit.
Monetary authorities must react to jumps in exchange rate volatility as they
distort the functioning of the exchange rate channel of policy transmission,
which has been proven to be unstable in the euro-candidate countries
(Golinelli and Rovelli, 2005; Orlowski, 2005, 2008a; Kočenda and Valachy,
2006; Kočenda et al., 2006). We therefore estimate conditional volatility of
exchange rate changes in response to key determinants of exchange rates,
that is, the uncovered interest parity and the purchasing power parity, in our
selected countries.
We also investigate the evolution of risks in the selected euro-candidate
countries during the past decade, with special attention to the propagating of the
2007–2009 global financial crisis. In order to capture risk dynamics, we examine
changes in the conditional volatility of major equity market indexes, relative
short-term interest rates and daily changes in the euro value of local currencies.
Our sample period starts January 3, 2000 and ends August 7, 2009, with some
adjustments for different inception dates for the secondary market trading
of long-term government bonds in individual countries. In order to investigate
the conditional volatility dynamics we employ GARCH(p, q)-M-GED, the
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with the in-mean
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variance and generalized error distribution, testing. In particular, we focus on
the overall risk premium or discount, reflected by the positive or negative value
of the in-mean GARCH variance coefficient, the M-component. We further
examine the degree of leptokurtosis, which is measured by the extent to which
the GED parameter is less than 2, and the relative proportion of shocks or ‘news’
to volatility reflected by the ARCH(p) coefficients to the persistency in volatility
implied by the GARCH(1) coefficient. The time distribution of conditional
standard deviations from the GARCH series allows us to examine the subperiods of risk contraction and proliferation.
Equity market risk
In our conditional mean equation for the return process rt, changes in the log
of local equity market indexes Et|rt serve as a dependent variable. Changes
in the log of the German DAX40 index EtDAX40, and the log of the GARCH
2
variance st1
serve as regressors:


D log Etjrt ¼ b0 þ b1 D log EtDAX40 þ b2 log s2t1 þ et

ð1Þ

The corresponding GARCH(1, 1) conditional variance specification is
s2t ¼ h0 þ h1 e2t1 þ g1 s2t1

ð2Þ

2
with the ARCH(1) component denoted by et1
and the GARCH(1) denoted
2
by st1.

Interest rate risk
Changes in the domestic short-term interest rate, the 3-month interbank
lending rate, it3M, are modeled in relation to changes in the 3-month Euribor
it3M and in the log exchange rate st. The inclusion of both independent
variables allows for testing their possible impact on the key monetary policy
instrument variable and explains the degree of monetary policy autonomy.
The conditional mean specification with the in-mean log GARCH variance is

3M
Ditjrt
¼ b0 þ b1 Dit3M þ b2 D logðst Þ þ b3 log s2t1 þ et

ð3Þ

The corresponding GARCH(p, 1) conditional variance specification is
s2t ¼ h0 þ h1 e2t1 þ h2 e2t2 þ    þ hp e2tp þ g1 s2t1

ð4Þ

High-order ARCH terms are applied in this case as they proved to be
significant in preliminary testing.
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Exchange rate risk
In this model, we employ the GARCH-M-GED process ascertaining daily
changes in the local currency value of the euro st as a function of changes in
the differential between the 3-month interbank offer rates of the eurocandidate country it3M and the eurozone (Euribor) it3ME, and changes in the
term spread on 10-year less 3-month sovereign bond yields it10Yit3M as a
proxy of inflation expectations. The model also includes changes in the local
equity market index Et as a regressor in the conditional mean equation in
order to reflect the impact of equity capital flows on exchange rates. The
conditional mean equation is represented by


D logðsÞtjrt ¼ b0 þ b1 D i10Y
 it3M þ b2 D it3M  it3ME
t

þ b3 DEt þ b4 log s2t1 þ et

ð5Þ

The corresponding GARCH(p, q) conditional variance equation is
s2t ¼ h0 þ h1 e2t1 þ h2 e2t2 þ    þ hp e2tp
þ g1 s2t1 þ g2 s2t2 þ    þ gq s2tq

ð6Þ

2
As in the previous cases, the ARCH(p) terms hpetp
represent the impact
2
of ‘news’ or shocks to volatility, and the GARCH(q) terms gqstq
reflect the
3
role of persistency in volatility. In all cases, the selection of p and q orders is
obtained by minimizing the Akaike and the Schwartz information criteria.

ESTIMATION RESULTS
Equity market risk developments
The results of the GARCH-M-GED estimation, equations 1 and 2, of changes
in local equity market indexes relative to changes in the German DAX40
are shown in Table 1. Changes in the German stock market index drive the
euro-candidates indexes in the same direction, but at a varied degree of
significance. The most significant relationship is detected for Hungarian
and Slovak markets; the Polish and Czech markets show a less significant
3
In the preliminary testing, we augmented the conditional volatility series (equations 2, 4
and 6) with an EU accession dummy variable assuming the value of one for the period following the
accession and zero for the preceding period, in order to ascertain the impact of the EU membership
on risk developments in the investigated series. This variable has proven to be insignificant in all
examined cases, suggesting that the EU accession has not decisively contributed to the financial
stability of the euro-candidates.
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Table 1: Changes in (the log of) equity market indexes vis-à-vis the changes in (the log of)
the German DAX40 index. GARCH-M-GED estimation – equations 1 and 2. Daily series; sample period
January 3, 2000 – August 7, 2009
Variables +

Czech Republic

Poland

Conditional mean equation (coefficient  100)
Constant term
6.633*
1.092**
German DAX40 index
9.306*
1.493*
Log(GARCH)
0.084**
1.304***
Conditional variance equation
Constant
0.001***
ARCH(1)
0.118***
GARCH(1)
0.868***
GED parameter
1.387***
Diagnostic statistics
Log likelihood
AIC
SIC
Durbin–Watson stat.

7,432.9
5.936
5.919
1.86

0.001**
0.052***
0.942***
1.356***
6,905.5
5.514
5.498
1.93

Hungary

Romania

1.972
17.998***
0.018
0.001***
0.089 ***
0.887***
1.418***
7,114.0
5.681
5.665
1.89

Slovakia

6.263**
8.407
0.065**

0.052***
3.541***
0.005

0.001***
0.334***
0.655***
1.045***

0.001***
0.094***
0.654***
0.568***

7,094.3
5.665
5.650
1.70

8,595.1
6.859
6.843
1.99

***denotes significance at 1%, **at 5% and *at 10%.
Notes: All variables are in first differences; t-statistics are in parentheses; AIC ¼ Akaike information
criterion, SIC ¼ Schwartz information criterion; stock market indexes are Prague PX50, Warsaw WIG20,
Budapest BUX, Bucharest BET(L), Bratislava SXSAX16.
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Datastream data

dependence on German market movements, and the reaction of the Romanian
market is insignificant. There is a negative risk premium on the Czech and
Polish equity markets, as implied by the negative sign of log(GARCH) terms in
the conditional mean equation. In contrast, the risk premium on the Romanian
market is significantly positive. The risk premia results for Hungary and
Slovakia are inconclusive.
Consistent with the behavior of global equity markets, volatility of the
Czech, Polish and Hungarian markets is highly persistent, as implied by GARCH
coefficients in the conditional variance equations being close to unity. The
ARCH-type shocks to volatility in these three markets play a relatively minor
role. The Romanian market conditional volatility series displays very different
characteristics with a stronger role for ARCH terms and a lower degree of
GARCH persistency. Arguably, the Romanian market is the most susceptible
to unexpected shocks to volatility among the analyzed group of equity
markets. More importantly from the standpoint of our analytical objectives,
the estimated GED parameters in all five equity markets are significantly
lower than 2, indicating considerable leptokurtosis, that is, pronounced
extreme tail risks. Evidently, volatility in these markets tends to escalate
considerably during turbulent market periods, while it remains subdued at
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tranquil times. Another focal point of our analysis is the sum of ARCH
and GARCH coefficients. It is very close to unity in the cases of the Czech,
Polish, Hungarian and Romanian markets, which suggests no visible gains in
volatility convergence. The sum is significantly below one only for the Slovak
market, implying an overall reduction in volatility, and thus a significant
decline in market risk in this new member of the eurozone.
The time-path of conditional volatilities for the Czech, Polish, Hungarian,
Slovak and Romanian stock market indexes is shown in Figures 1(a)–(e). In
all five cases, market risk surged during the peak of the recent global financial
crisis. The largest volatility upswings in the GARCH series took place during
the peak of the crisis in the October 10 – November 15, 2008 period. All five
stock markets took an unprecedented hit on October 10, in the aftermath of
the Lehman Brothers collapse that triggered the subsequent global credit
market freeze, coupled with international investors’ withdrawal of capital
from emerging markets. The October 10 market plunge was followed by series
of up-and-down swings of the euro-candidates’ equity markets, with the
elevated volatility not receding to its pre-crisis pattern until July–August of
2009. The analysis of volatility dynamics with respect to the pre- and the postEU accession periods is also revealing. The GARCH residuals seem to recede
gradually during the pre-accession periods in all five markets, but there is
no discernible containment of volatility since the respective EU accessions.
It can be therefore argued that EU membership has not engendered stability
in equity markets of the euro-candidates. Moreover, euro adoption did not
contain stock market volatility in Slovakia. This seems to suggest that entering
the common currency system does not insulate a local stock market from
large external shocks. The volatility patterns in Slovakia should be of concern
for monetary authorities in the euro-candidates because euro adoption does
not automatically bring about gains in financial stability.
Thus, equity markets in the euro-candidates remain highly vulnerable to
exogenous shocks, as proven by the significant leptokurtosis in their volatility
dynamics series.4 The likelihood of disruptive spillover effects of elevated
equity market risk into domestic credit, investment and economic growth at
times of financial distress remains very high.
Interest rate risk
The empirical results for equations 3 and 4 are shown in Table 2. From the
perspective of our study’s objectives, the most striking outcome is the extreme
4

Similar conclusions can be found in Hanousek et al. (2009) and Hanousek and Kočenda
(2011), who examine the impact of macroeconomic announcements and external market news on
volatility of Central European equity markets.
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Figure 1: GARCH conditional standard deviation for equity market index series vis-à-vis German DAX40
(a) The Czech Republic: Prague SE PX Index; (b) Poland: Warsaw WIG20 Index; (c) Hungary: Budapest BUX
Index; (d) Romania: Bucharest BET(L) Index; (e) Slovakia: Bratislava SXSAX16 Index
Source: Own estimations based on Datastream data

leptokurtosis of the interbank rates volatility series in all five cases, which is
more pronounced than is the leptokurtosis of the equity market series. The
estimated GED parameters for the interbank markets of the euro-candidates
are all very low, indicating the prevalence of extreme tail risks. This finding
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Table 2: Changes in 3-month market interest rates vis-à-vis the changes in Euribor 3-month rates and the
log of the exchange rate against the euro. GARCH-M-GED estimation – equations 3 and 4. Daily series;
sample period January 3, 2000 – August 7, 2009
Variables +

Czech Republic

Hungary

Romania

Slovakia

Conditional mean equation (coefficient  100)
Constant term
0.124***
0.000***
EURIBOR3M
0.000
0.000
Log(Exchange rate)
0.000
0.000
Log(GARCH)
0.000***
0.000***

0.000***
0.000***
0.000
0.000***

38.801***
0.000***
0.017***
11.468***

28.041***
0.000
0.000
3.972***

Conditional variance equation
Constant
0.000***
ARCH(1)
0.537***
ARCH(2)
0.280***
ARCH(3)
F
GARCH(1)
0.520
GED parameter
0.266***

0.006***
2.314***
1.309**
F
0.789***
0.234***

0.000***
0.780***
0.480***
0.179***
0.876***
0.155***

0.002***
0.006***
0.002***
F
0.412***
0.174***

0.000***
0.012***
0.008***
0.000***
0.652***
0.380***

Diagnostic statistics
Log likelihood
AIC
SIC
Durbin–Watson stat.

4,301.81
3.430
3.409
2.314

7,779.824
6.208
6.185
1.852

5,502.916
4.390
4.369
1.107

5,832.546
4.962
4.937
1.670

10,634.12
8.490
8.469
2.020

Poland

***denotes significance at 1%, **at 5% and *at 10%.
Notes: All variables are in first differences; t-statistics are in parentheses; AIC ¼ Akaike information
criterion, SIC ¼ Schwartz information criterion.
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Datastream data

supports the claim that short-term interest rates of the euro-candidates are likely
to jump significantly in times of financial distress, underscoring exceptional
vulnerability of their banking sectors to external shocks. In addition, there is
a significant risk discount in the cases of the Romanian and Slovak rates as
implied by the negative log(GARCH) coefficients in the conditional mean
equations. These reactions are likely related to the very high initial interest rate
risk premia in these two countries as well as to changes in interbank borrowing
from local rather than eurozone banks. At the same time, there is a very small
interest rate risk discount detected for the Czech, Polish and Hungarian
interbank rate series. The conditional volatility series of interbank rates is highly
persistent for Polish and Hungarian interbank markets, as signified by high
values of GARCH coefficients. Interbank rates remain vulnerable to ARCH-type
shocks with non-uniform diffusion in the cases of the Czech, Polish and
Hungarian rates.
The graphical displays (Figures 2(a)–(e)) of the GARCH conditional
standard deviation series show large jumps in interest rate volatility for the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania coinciding with the October 10, 2008
turbulence in global financial markets. Poland is a notable exception.
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Figure 2: GARCH(p, q)-M-GED conditional standard deviations of daily changes in local 3M interbank
rates in relation to changes in 3M Euribor and the exchange rate, equations 3 and 4. January 3, 2000 –
August 7, 2009 daily series. (a) Czech interbank rates, GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (b) Poland’s interbank rates
GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (c) Hungary’s interbank rates GARCH(3, 1)-M-GED; (d) Romania’s interbank rates
GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (e) Slovakia’s interbank rates GARCH(3, 1)-M-GED
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Datastream data

In all, relative interest rate volatility in the euro-candidate countries remains
very high. It also remains elevated in Slovakia, in spite of its being a member of
the eurozone. These high interest rate risk premia make the financial systems
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of the euro-candidates susceptible to large interest rate shocks and contagion
effects from global crises. Under such circumstances, a strict adherence of
monetary policy to interest rate rules seems both implausible and counterproductive for creating the foundations of financial stability.
Exchange rate risks
The exchange rate volatility model is multivariate and thus more elaborate
than the equity market and the interbank rate models, due to the overall
statistical significance of the regressors included in the conditional mean
equation. The estimation results of the exchange rate volatility series
specified by equations 5 and 6 are shown in Table 3.
The results reveal that changes in euro values expressed in local currencies
are highly sensitive to changes in local stock market indexes for all examined
countries, with the notable exception of Slovakia, as implied by the negative

Table 3: Changes in (the log) exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro as a function of changes in: the
term spread on sovereign bond yields, the 3M interest rate differential and the stock market index.
GARCH-M-GED estimation – equations 5 and 6. Daily series; sample period January 3, 2000 – August 7,
2009 (April 1, 2005 – August 7, 2009 for Romania; January 3, 2003 – December 31, 2008 for Slovakia)
Variables +

Czech Republic

Poland

Hungary

Romania

Slovakia

Conditional mean equation (coefficient  100)
Constant term
0.002
Term spread
0.317**
Interest rate differential
0.293
Stock market index
1.483***
Log(GARCH)
0.002

0.346*
1.232***
1.218***
5.277***
0.034*

0.164*
1.990***
2.124***
2.592***
0.014*

0.191*
0.056**
0.290***
4.055***
0.018*

0.000
0.044
0.037
0.031
0.000

Conditional variance equation
Constant
ARCH(1)
ARCH(2)
ARCH(3)
GARCH(1)
GED parameter

0.000**
0.204***
0.177***
F
0.969***
1.050***

0.000**
0.154***
0.102***
F
0.941***
1.280***

0.000***
0.286***
0.078
0.097**
0.891***
0.995***

0.000**
0.339***
0.263***
F
0.924***
0.939***

0.000**
0.167***
F
F
0.861***
0.842***

Diagnostic statistics
Log likelihood
AIC
SIC
Durbin–Watson stat.

9,442.985
8.487
8.461
2.125

8,381.908
7.539
7.513
2.256

9,106.733
8.191
8.162
2.232

4,590.746
8.261
8.216
1.913

9,574.790
9.189
9.165
1.990

***denotes significance at 1%, **at 5% and *at 10%.
Notes: All variables are in first differences; AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion, SIC ¼ Schwartz
information criterion; a minus 1-day lag is applied to the Czech 3M Pribor vis-à-vis 3M Euribor; term
spread reflects 10Y less 3M sovereign bond yields; short-term interest rates are: 3M Pribor, 3M Wibor,
3M Bubor, RMIBK3M, 3M Skibor, 3M Euribor; stock market indexes are Prague PX50, Warsaw WIG20,
Budapest BUX, Bucharest BET(L), Bratislava SXSAX16.
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Datastream and Eurostat data
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signs of the equity market index coefficients. This suggests that capital inflows
to domestic equity markets correspond to the local currency appreciation (euro
depreciation), which underpins a strong role of foreign capital inflows in local
market movements. A wider term spread on sovereign bond yields (corresponds) to the depreciation of the Polish Zloty (PLN), the Czech Koruna (CZK),
the Hungarian Forint (HUF), the Slovak Koruna (SKK), but not the Romanian
Leu (RON). In the first four cases, the wider term spread translates into currency
depreciation, thus satisfying the purchasing power parity conditions, as it likely
reflects rising long-term inflation expectations. The interest rate differential
captured by the widening spread between local interbank offer rates and the
Euribor rate is associated with the depreciation of CZK, PLN and HUF, contrary
to the uncovered interest parity assumptions because local banks are likely to
increase borrowings in the local currency when it is expected to depreciate.
Romania is again a notable exception. We could not detect a risk premium or
discount on local currencies in any of the examined cases, as the log(GARCH)
coefficients in the mean equations are all insignificant.5
The conditional volatility of the analyzed series is highly persistent in all
five euro-candidates, as implied by GARCH(1) coefficients all being close to
unity. The most significant ARCH shocks to volatility are detected for RON,
followed by the HUF, CZK and PLN series. Certainly, the most crucial finding
of the tests is the very high degree of leptokurtosis in the exchange rate series
in all five cases, as implied by the estimated GED parameters significantly
lower than 2. Nonetheless, the extreme risk in the case of the exchange rate
volatility series is considerably less pronounced than the one detected for the
interbank rates series.
Further insights in the time-varying path of exchange rate volatility are
provided by GARCH standard deviations shown in Figures 3(a)–(e). During
the post-EU accession periods, the conditional exchange rate volatility has
remained subdued for CZK, PLN and HUF, but clearly not for RON. It is worth
noting that there have been several pronounced volatility jumps in SKK series
during this period. However, Slovakia’s becoming a member of the eurozone
in January 2009 had evidently helped mitigate exchange rate risk in the
preceding turbulent months while at the same time exchange rate risk was
elevated in the euro-candidate countries, where it has remained elevated in
the aftermath of the October 10, 2008 peak of the global financial crisis, with
signs of returning to pre-crisis volatility levels only in mid-2009.
5
See Kočenda and Poghosyan (2009) for a more detailed examination of the macroeconomic
determinants of the exchange rate risk in the new EU Member States. Using the stochastic discount
factor and GARCH-M testing, they provide evidence that both nominal and real economic variables
play important role in the determination of exchange rate risk in these countries.
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Figure 3: GARCH conditional standard deviations generated from estimations of equations 5 and 6
reported in Table 3. January 3, 2000 – August 7, 2009 daily series. (a) The Czech Republic:
GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (b) Poland: GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (c) Hungary: GARCH(3, 1)-M-GED; (d) Romania
(April 1, 2005 – August 7, 2009 daily series): GARCH(2, 1)-M-GED; (e) Slovakia (January 3,
2003 – December 31, 2008 series): GARCH(1, 1)-M-GED
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Datastream and Eurostat data

In essence, the 2007–2009 global financial crisis has hampered the
process of gaining exchange rate stability in the analyzed countries, with
the notable exception of Slovakia, whose euro adoption cushioned the
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transmission of global financial shocks. One may thus argue that the
prospects of adopting the euro, including the formal entry to the ERM2, may
reduce exchange rate risk in these countries and also lead to a more effective
absorption of external shocks.

MONETARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EURO-CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES
Our empirical findings shed new light on the recent monetary policy debate,
which White (2009) summarizes as the ‘lean versus clean’ policy dilemma. The
traditional approach assumed that financial crisis episodes are unpredictable,
and thus monetary policy should follow a pre-determined rule at all times, and
‘clean up’ after a crisis. This approach was well suited for the ‘happy’ period
of the Great Moderation epitomized by small business cycle fluctuations and
low financial risks. The recent financial crisis engendered more significant
fluctuations, provoking the question whether monetary policies can ‘lean
against the wind’ (White, 2009), by being oriented toward containing excessive
credit expansion and pre-emptive countering of asset-price bubbles already in
the pre-crisis period. Among others, Borio and White (2003) and Svensson
(2010) differentiate between the tasks of monetary policy and the tasks of
financial stability policy all within a new framework of macro-financial stability.
We are led to believe that synchronized monetary and regulatory policies should
counteract the shocks that are permanent, that is, those that can permanently
imperil financial stability and aggravate systemic risk, rather than those that are
transitory.
With respect to the euro-candidate countries, our empirical analysis
implies that outbreaks of financial crisis episodes can be signaled, even in
seemingly tranquil times, based on the monitoring of tail risks embedded in
the behavior of key monetary policy target and instrument variables. Hence,
we argue that monetary policies need to take into consideration the task of
mitigating these risks. In order to fulfill this task, monetary policies ought to
become more unorthodox and seemingly more complex than those based on
simple Taylor rules. Such policies should be counter-cyclical, and they should
be reasonably restrictive and aimed at preventing an excessive buildup of
debt in the economy during the normal market periods. They should become
decisively expansionary at times of financial distress in order to increase the
supply of loanable funds and sustain bank lending.
We further note that standard forecasting models, based on the key
monetary and financial variables such as inflation, interest rates or the
output gap, are not very useful for detecting extreme financial market risks
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because they assume mean reversion over a long period. In fact, recent
monetary policies of the central banks following such models have turned
out to be pro-cyclical and seemingly ineffective for abating asset-price
bubbles (Hellwig, 2008; Jobst, 2009). Prior to the recent crisis, reference
interest rates that were implied by parsimonious rules à la Taylor were
declining in spite of the accelerating credit boom. Thus, they contributed to
increasing private debt and rising asset prices. Central banks in the eurocandidate countries followed the same pro-cyclical policy of lowering
interest rates as inflation and long-term interest rates declined after EU
accession (Orlowski, 2010a).
On the basis of the above arguments, we advocate a new financial
stability framework for the euro-candidate countries that includes three basic
synchronized components: monetary policy, (macro- and micro-) prudential
stability policy and international collaboration.
Monetary policy is a prime component within the suggested framework.
In order to respond effectively to possible outbreaks of extreme risks,
monetary policy ought to be counter-cyclical and also relatively flexible.
Extreme risks can be at least partially mitigated by forward-looking policies
based on smoothed forecasts. As suggested by the empirical findings, the
episodes of extreme risks, particularly those prevalent in the interbank credit
markets, have seriously distorted forecasts of key monetary policy variables.
The recent financial crisis has made these forecasts increasingly unreliable
and inaccurate. Our study underscores the need to detect leptokurtosis in the
forecasting models. This can be done for instance by augmenting GARCH
volatility tests with GED parameterization. If the estimated GED parameter
is less than 2, leptokurtic distribution is detected. Disturbances of this nature
are likely to take place in the future if the monetary authorities of the eurocandidates do not adequately address tail risks through a broad range of
emergency measures, such as sterilized interventions, large liquidity injections,
currency swap lines, special lending facilities for banks, etc. In essence,
effective risk-mitigating policies cannot be based only on interest rate
adjustments.
Prudential regulatory policies comprise the second component of the
proposed framework. Not only monetary policies, but also prudential regulatory
policies should be counter-cyclical and lean against the bubbles whose
potential implosion could impair financial system stability, as implied by
the ‘Geneva Report’ (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). In the case of euro-candidate
countries, such policies should include regulation aimed at controlling
excessive leverage of banks, particularly foreign banks, that engenders
pro-cyclical effects. A problem remains that monetary policies customarily
assume that commodity and labor markets have sticky prices, while asset
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prices are not sticky, experiencing at times abrupt changes consistent with
the prevalence of fat tails. We argue that high leptokurtosis, that is, extreme
tail risks associated with abrupt price adjustments stem from asset-price
volatility. Asset prices in euro-candidate countries are highly correlated with
bank lending, which is strongly influenced by high foreign bank participation
in domestic credit markets (Gabrisch, 2010). Substantial credit booms spurred
by foreign banks in these countries can threaten the macroeconomic and
financial stability of the region. It seems, therefore, necessary to enact
regulations to control the excessive leverage of banks, particularly foreigncontrolled ones, that has engendered pro-cyclical effects.
The third component is international collaboration. In hindsight, the
extreme risks of financial variables arise from asset-price bubbles generated
not only by domestic factors, but also transmitted through external spillovers.
Owing to the international transmission of shocks, international coordination
of these policies is crucial, particularly for the euro-candidate countries as
a group pursuing the joint task of adopting the euro. This is a special
requirement for euro-candidates because the engagement of international
banks is relatively high in terms of equity and participation in domestic
lending. International collaboration should not be limited to emergency
situations only, such as the efforts of the Vienna Initiative launched in
January 2009 in response to the recent crisis. It should start in seemingly
tranquil times simultaneously in host and home countries of international
banks. Macro- and micro-prudential regulation and agreements should be
mutually coordinated in order to avert possible loopholes and asymmetric
effects.
We further advocate that central banks in the euro-candidate countries
should take over more responsibility for both monetary and regulatory
policies in the future. This is due to pro-cyclical effects of simultaneous
actions of banks, households, private companies and the government in both
crisis and pre-crisis periods. Private sector expectations in anticipation of the
euro adoption are likely to boost both private and public spending, and
ultimately improve profitability of financial institutions. Central banks in
these countries, as independent institutions, are certainly qualified to steer
the smooth euro-convergence process effectively, but they need to account for
possible outbreaks of extreme risks in financial markets.

A SUMMARY
Our study investigates extreme tail risks embedded in the behavior of key
monetary and financial variables in four euro-candidate countries: the
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We also include Slovakia,
already a euro-member, for comparative purposes. We discuss implications of extreme risks for monetary policies in these countries and
provide policy suggestions. These risks exist in every monetary economy.
On practical grounds, they stem from leptokurtic distribution of financial
variables.
Our empirical investigation of the equity market, interest rate and
exchange rate risks reaffirms prevalence of significant tail risks in the
examined countries, as implied by the leptokurtic data distribution in the
conditional volatility series. We find that extreme tail risks associated with
interbank rates are more pronounced than those of equity market indexes
and exchange rates. Our tests also show that external contagion effects of
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis were very strong, triggering excessive
volatility in all financial markets of the euro-candidate countries. Evidently,
these countries face a continuous challenge of enhancing financial stability
and institutional resiliency against global financial contagion.
Monetary policies can help mitigate extreme tail risks in financial
markets of the euro-candidates. In order to accomplish this task, monetary
policies should aim at preventing anticipated outbreaks of volatility of key
financial variables to counteract excessive upswings of credit cycles. Monetary
policies following this concept should be reasonably restrictive and aim at
preventing an excessive buildup of debt in the economy. However, they
should become decisively expansionary at times of financial distress in order
to increase the supply of loanable funds and sustain bank lending. Such
flexible policy responses are possible when monetary policy conduct departs
from rigid instrument rules and resorts to discretionary prevention of financial
market distress. Monetary policies aimed at mitigating extreme tail risks
ought to be comprehensive and supplemented with appropriate macro- and
micro-prudential regulatory responses as they all comprise a financial stability
policy framework. Moreover, monetary and regulatory policies ought to be
mutually coordinated in order to eliminate asymmetric responses within a
cohesive bloc of countries.
In essence, we advocate a new financial stability framework for the
euro-candidates, which includes three basic synchronized components:
monetary policy, (macro- and micro-) prudential stability policy and
international synchronization.
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Kočenda, E and Poghosyan, T. 2009: Macroeconomic sources of foreign exchange risk in new EU
members. Journal of Banking and Finance 33(11): 2164–2173.
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